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Some guidelines for the comparison of different quantum key distribution
experiments are proposed. An improved «plug & play » interferometric system
allowing fast key exchange is then introduced. Self-alignment and compensation of
birefringence remain. Original electronics implementing the BB84 protocol and
allowing user-friendly operation is presented. Key creation with 0.1 photon per
pulse at a rate of 486 Hz with a 5.4% QBER – corresponding to a net rate of 210Hz -
over a 23 Km installed cable was performed.
Introduction
The expansion of telecommunications during the past two decades has
induced the need for the development of new cryptographic techniques
offering high security as well as easy key management. The so-called public
key cryptosystems, initially proposed by Diffie and Hellman [1] in 1975, were
the first attempt to solve the key distribution problem. They make use of
mutually inverse transformations for encrypting and decrypting. The
encryption algorithm and key are made public – hence the name of public
key cryptosystems - and the safety relies on the high complexity of the
inverse transformation, unless the decryption – or private – key can be used.
These ciphers form the class of asymmetric cryptosystems, of which RSA [2]
is the most widely used. However, they suffer from a major flaw, namely the
fact that their security relies on unproven assumptions about complexity
theory. A fast algorithm could indeed break them. Although such an algorithm
has already been proposed for quantum computers, it is not sure whether a
similar one could also be found for classical computers.
The fact that this discovery would immediately jeopardise the secrecy of most
electronic communications explains the strong interest in alternate encryption
techniques. One could of course use symmetric ciphers. This class of
cryptosystems includes Vernam's "one time pad", which is the only one
offering proven absolute secrecy. In this case however, the problem is shifted
to the distribution of the secret key safely between the emitter and the
receiver. A spy could indeed intercept the key material and copy it. Quantum
key distribution – often referred to as quantum cryptography – prevents this
from happening. It complements symmetric ciphers, to simplify their
implementation. This promising application has triggered a very strong
interest in the industry as well as in the public. Its security is based on the
2principles of physics, and not on any unproven assumptions about complexity
theory.
Quantum key distribution (QKD), first proposed in 1984 by Bennett and
Brassard [3], allows two remote parties – usually called Alice and Bob - to
generate a secret random key, used to carry out secure communications,
without meeting or resorting to the services of a courier. It is based on the
fact that, according to quantum physics, performing a measurement on an
unknown state will in most cases disturb it. This property can be exploited to
reveal an eavesdropper. Indeed, if the sequence of transmitted bits, encoded
in non-orthogonal states, does not contain any errors, it can be inferred that
no unlegitimate party tried to listen in. QKD was first demonstrated in 1989 by
Bennett and his co-workers over 30 cm in air [4], and since then a long way
has been covered by the quantum optics community. Various groups have
indeed implemented it in optical fibres over distances up to tens of kilometres
[5,6,7,8,9].
In this article, we would like first to consider the criteria that should be used to
compare different experimental realisations of QKD. We then discuss an
improved version of the “plug & play” QKD system, before looking at
experimental results obtained. Finally, we discuss the respective advantages
of various schemes, before concluding.
Comparing Quantum Key Distribution Schemes
Without going too much into details (see [10, 11] for a thorough description of
the principle of QKD), quantum key distribution can be split in three
elementary processes. First, Alice and Bob must generate a raw key, by
exchanging photons over the quantum channel, which usually consists of an
optical fibre. The term “raw key” comes from the fact that, due to
experimental imperfections such as detector noise, the distributed bit
sequence contains errors, even without tampering by an eavesdropper.
Performing the distribution of this first key at a fast rate without introducing
too many errors and complicated operation is the task of experimental
physicists. The raw key creation rate (Rraw) and the quantum bit error rate
(QBER) are the two quantities usually presented to characterise the
performance of a QKD scheme.
The second step involves the estimate of the QBER within the raw key and
the correction of these errors through discussion over a public channel.
Performing this results in a shortening of the key to make up for the
information revealed in the process to Eve. As the fraction of bits to discard
increases with the QBER, it is essential to keep it as low as possible. This
operation resorts to standard error correction procedures developed within
the framework of classical information theory.
Finally, the third step reduces the information having leaked to Eve during the
first two stages to an arbitrarily low value through a privacy amplification
procedure. It also amounts to a reduction of the key length, which increases
with the QBER. Indeed, the errors must be completely attributed to Eve. After
this last procedure, Alice and Bob share exclusively a perfectly correlated
sequence of bits, the useful key that can be exploited to carry out secure
3communications. Although not directly related to the physical QKD process,
the last two steps do matter to experimental physicists. The way they are
performed determines indeed the ratio of the length of the useful key to that
of the raw key for a given QBER. They set an upper limit to the error rate,
above which key distillation becomes impossible.
In order to predict the performance of a given QKD scheme the key
distribution rate before error correction and privacy amplification Rraw can be
estimated from experimental parameters using the following formula (see [10]
for a discussion of this expression):
(1)
q is a systematic factor depending on the chosen implementation. In the case
of the BB84 four states protocol [3] for example, it is equal to ½, as half of the
time the bases chosen randomly by Alice and Bob are not compatible. m is
the average number of photons per pulses. In a more rigorous treatment, one
should replace this quantity by the probability to have a pulse containing at
least one photon. Provided it is small, it is well approximated by the average
of the Poisson distribution. n the repetition frequency and hd the detector
efficiency. Finally ht is the transfer efficiency between Alice’s output and
Bob’s detectors, which can be expressed as:
(2)
where Lf corresponds to the attenuation in the fibre in dB/km, l to the length
of the link in km and LB to Bob’s internal losses in dB.
The quantum bit error rate QBER, generally expressed as the relative
fraction of wrong bits in the detected sequence, can be evaluated as the ratio
of the probability of getting a false detection to the total probability of
detection per pulse (see [10]):
(3)
with pphot = m ht hd, we obtain:
(4)
hhmn= dtraw qR
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4pnoise and pphot are the probabilities to register a count arising from noise and
from a photon respectively, while popt is the probability for a photon to reach
the wrong detector. The QBER consists of two parts. The first one, called
QBERdet, is caused by the nois counts, mainly due to detector dark counts.
The second part, QBERopt, is caused by the propagation of photons to the
wrong detector, because of incorrect phase or polarisation determination.
When the transmission distance increases, the transfer efficiency ht becomes
smaller, while pnoise does not change. This results in an increase of QBERdet,
which imposes the principal limitation on long distance QKD.
With the help of these equations, we can easily compute the raw key creation
rate Rraw and QBER under given experimental conditions. As the errors
present in the raw bit sequence are suppressed during key distillation, the
useful key creation rate Ruseful – after error correction and privacy
amplification – constitutes the only figure of merit that actually matters. It is
thus essential to determine to what extent Rraw is reduced by the key
distillation procedures, as a function of the QBER.
On the one hand, it is possible to use an estimate by Tancevski et al. [12].
The fraction of bits lost in the process of error correction as a function of the
QBER is given for long strings (> 100 bits) by:
(5)
This expression is valid for small QBER. Rec increases with the error rate,
which implies that it is important to keep it low.
On the other hand, the fraction of bits lost through privacy amplification can
be estimated by [11,13]:
(6)
It is assumed that all errors are caused by Eve’s tampering and that she can
gain a maximum information of 4 QBER / Ö2 [4] or about 2 QBER / ln2. This
assumption implies that the average number of photon per pulse m is small
enough – typically 0.1 – to ensure that a low fraction of the pulses contains
more than one photon. If this condition is not respected, the estimate does
not apply anymore.
Finally, the useful key creation rate can be estimated:
(7)
When assessing different QKD schemes, two aspects must be considered.
One must first look at the performance of the systems, in terms of key
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5creation rate. Experimental results – in the form of measured Rraw and QBER
- for various schemes are available in numerous publications. They are
difficult to compare though, because of the differences in experimental
conditions. For example, the length of the transmission line, and hence the
transfer efficiency, used for the tests is different in each case. Although most
authors agree on using an average number of photon per pulse of 0.1 to
ensure high secrecy, some use higher values, making comparisons
impossible without scaling of the results. In our opinion, in spite of the fact
that using values of m larger than 0.1 may still be safe with present day
technology, it should be avoided, if one wants to claim that the security is
based on the law of quantum physics.
To make it possible to compare the key creation and error rates Rraw and
QBER for several QKD systems, one should scale these quantities using
equations (1) and (4) for a given transmission distance and average number
of photons per pulse of 0.1. One can expect to measure these scaled rates, if
the experiment was repeated over this distance and with this average
number of photons per pulse. If one were for example to use m = 0.2 in
experimental tests, the scaled raw key rate would be smaller and the scaled
QBER larger by a factor of approximately two. However, the problem is not
completely solved yet. How should one proceed to compare systems with
different scaled Rraw and QBER? These two quantities depend on the relation
between hd and pnoise, which varies from one photon counting detector
system to the other. The solution is simply to compute the useful key creation
rate estimate from the scaled Rraw and QBER using equations (5) to (7). It
appears now clearly why it is very misleading to consider QKD systems with
average photon number larger than 0.1. When scaling the results to m = 0.1,
Rraw is not only decreased, but the QBER is also increased. This implies that
when computing the useful rate Ruseful, it will be further reduced by this extra
QBER contribution. In this case, it is important to remember that because the
estimate of bits lost during privacy amplification is not valid if m is larger than
0.1, one must first scale the results before evaluating the useful rate.
The second aspect to consider when comparing systems is the intrinsic
simplicity of use. What adjustments are required when connecting a QKD
system to a transmission line? How difficult and frequent these adjustments
must be? All systems using gated detectors require for example high
precision (nanosecond or better) synchronisation of Alice and Bob, in order to
trigger the photon counters just before the arrival of a photon. This
adjustment however does not need to be repeated too frequently. Indeed it
depends mainly on the length of the transmission line, which varies only
slightly. Other adjustments include polarisation or interferometer alignment.
Improved Version of the “Plug & Play” QKD System
Quantum key distribution has been demonstrated in optical fibres by several
groups using either polarisation encoding schemes [5, 6, 7], or phase
encoding ones [8, 9]. The main difficulty with polarisation encoding is the
need to keep the polarisation stable over distances of tens of kilometres. It
was indeed shown that, because of the birefringence of the fibres and the
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Although these variations are slow enough to allow active polarisation
tracking, such a compensation could be unpractical in a real system.
To avoid this problem, an alternative is to encode the value of the bits in the
phase of the photons instead of their polarisation. One must then use an
interferometric key distribution system, consisting usually of two Mach-
Zehnder interferometers in series separated by the transmission line.
However if one wants to keep QBERopt low, high interference visibility must
be guaranteed. Alice and Bob must make sure that both of their
interferometers are identical: same coupling ratios and same path length.
They must keep them stable within a few tens of nanometer during the
course of the transmission, which constitutes the major difficulty. Moreover
such a system still requires polarisation control in the interferometers. The
polarisation of both interfering contributions must be parallel, to ensure high
interference visibility.
We introduced in 1997 a new phase encoding quantum cryptography system
intrinsically stable and polarisation independent [14]. This interferometer
does not require path alignment thanks to time multiplexing. In addition
polarisation control is made superfluous by the use of Faraday mirrors to
cancel the effect optical fibre birefringence. Apart from synchronisation of
Alice and Bob, no adjustment at all is necessary. This is why we refer
informally to this scheme as “plug & play”. It was tested and showed high
interference visibility and outstanding stability. A useful key creation rate of
approximately 0.5 Hz with the B92 protocol [15] was achieved [16]. In order
to assess its potential, we decided to introduce an improved version allowing
higher key creation rate and implementing the safer four states BB84
protocol. Moreover, we also decided to try to use photon counters with
simpler cooling requirements, and to develop original electronics allowing
automated operation of Alice and Bob.
As it induces several problems, increasing the key distribution rate does not
simply amount to turning up the repetition frequency, but requires re-
engineering of the whole system. To understand the first problem, it is
essential to remember that in the “plug & play” system, laser pulses are not
emitted by Alice towards Bob. They are emitted by Bob, travel to Alice where
they are reflected before coming back to Bob for detection. Because of the
Michelson interferometer configuration of the 97 implementation, an
important fraction of the light pulses is directly reflected straight into the
photon counting detector. It can increase the error rate through two
mechanisms. First, if this light reaches the detector at the same time as a
photon coming back from Alice, it can generate a false count due to the high
intensity difference, and increase the error rate. Choosing the lengths of the
various optical fibres so that the light reflected within Bob’s interferometer
does not impinge on the detector when it is gated could in principle solve this
problem. This is however not sufficient. We have indeed measured the
detection efficiency for InGaAs/InP avalanche photodiodes (APD) in photon
counting regime for pulses impinging before gating. Results are shown in
Figure 1 for two different detector temperatures. One notices that when the
light pulses reach the detector when it is gated, the efficiency is about 10%.
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gate first decreases by two orders of magnitude during the first 20 ns. At
longer time, the slope becomes very small. Although the remaining efficiency
is low, it may cause problems with strong reflections containing thousands of
photons. This implies that, contrary to what is usually assumed, avalanche
photodiodes in photon counting regime are not really blind when not gated.
At 173 K, the decrease of the efficiency is faster, and thus the timing
discrimination of the detector better. This problem could not be observed in
the 97 system. The repetition rate of 1 kHz was indeed low enough to ensure
that there was never more than one pulse in the optical fibre. The round trip
time of flight of a pulse was of approximately 230 ms for the 23 km long line
while the time interval between the emission of subsequent pulses was 1 ms.
To get round this difficulty, we developed a modified version of the “plug &
play” system shown in Figure 2. It does not feature any strong reflections of
emitted pulses into the photon counters. Although optical fibre connectors or
components may reflect some of the light, this intensity is low and does not
constitute a problem. Bob injects a light pulse through the circulator C, which
splits at coupler C1. The first half pulse travels through the short arm to the
polarising beamsplitter PBS. Polarisation evolution in this arm is set with a
polarisation controller (three loops on the diagram) so that the pulse is
completely transmitted at the PBS. It then propagates to Alice where it splits
again at coupler C2 to provide a timing signal upon detection by the linear
detector DA. The pulse then travels through Alice's equipment and is
reflected back to Bob. Thanks to the Faraday mirror, the birefringence of the
optical link is compensated, and the pulse comes back orthogonally
polarised, which implies that it is now reflected by the PBS and takes the long
arm. Bob finally applies a phase shift fB with its modulator PMB. The second
pulse propagates through both arms of Bob’s system in reverse order: long
arm first, reflection by the PBS, Alice and back, transmission by the PBS,
short arm. Alice applies to it a phase shift fA.  When applying their phase
pulses, Alice and Bob must be sure to affect only the intended pulse and not
both. This condition is most stringent for Alice where the pulses follow each
other, separated by a time interval corresponding to the length difference of
the short and long arms – typically 200 ns. Since both pulses travel exactly
the same optical path, they reach the coupler C1 simultaneously with
identical polarisation, giving rise to interference.  According to the phase
applied by Alice and Bob, the pulse chooses either deterministically or
probabilistically a detector. At Alice’s, the attenuator A is set so that the
average number of photon per pulse pair m is 0.1 when leaving her system.
In contrast to the 97 setup, polarisation alignment is required in Bob's
system. The polarisation evolution is set in each arm to maximise intensity at
the output port of the PBS. In addition, due to high polarisation dependent
losses of Bob’s phase modulator, a second polarisation controller is
necessary in the long arm. In an industrial realisation, polarisation-
maintaining fibres would, of course, be used. When switching from
constructive to destructive interference, we measured with classical light an
extinction ratio of 28.6 ± 0.8 dB. The polarisation separation of the PBS,
being of approximately 30 dB, constitutes the limiting factor for interference
visibility. This extinction does not vary with time. It does not depend either on
the optical fibre connected between Alice and Bob. A second advantage of
8this system over the 97 “plug & play” setup is the fact that two detectors can
be easily connected to the output ports of the interference coupler allowing
simple implementation of the BB84 protocol. One should note that Alice must
also use the detector DA to monitor the incoming light intensity in order to
prevent Eve from obtaining the value of her phase shift by sending strong
pulses into the system and measuring their phase.
A second difficulty related to high repetition rates is Rayleigh backscattering.
The light travelling in an optical fibre undergoes scattering by
inhomogeneities. A small fraction of this light is recaptured by the fibre in the
backward direction. Due to the intrinsic bi-directional nature of the “plug &
play” setups, pulses travelling to and back from Alice must intersect at some
point in the line. Their intensity is however strongly different. The pulses
coming from Bob are more than 30 dB brighter than the ones coming back
from Alice and containing less than 0.1 photon on average. Backscattered
photons can accompany a pulse propagating back to Bob and induce false
counts. Although the backscattering probability is very low, the high intensity
ratio between forward and backward propagating light and the single photon
sensitivity of the detectors can yield increased QBER. To prevent this
problem, we introduced a storage line SL in Alice's system. Bob emits his
pulses in the form of trains that travel to Alice and fill the storage line. He
waits until a train comes back, detects the pulses, and sends the next one.
Intersection of forward and backward travelling light takes place inside the
storage line and not in the transmission line. As it is located behind the
attenuator, the intensity ratio is low enough so that the backscattered
intensity cannot cause false detections. The losses induced by this storage
line do not amount to a reduction of the transfer efficiency, because the
attenuator will be set to keep the average number of photons per pulse at 0.1
at the output of Alice. However the effective repetition frequency of the
system is reduced in such a configuration. The emission and detection of the
pulses are sequential and separated by the time taken by the photons to
travel through the transmission line, the storage line, and back. A storage line
half as long as the transmission line amounts to a reduction of the effective
repetition frequency by a factor of approximately three. Increasing the length
of the storage line can reduce this effect. If it is too long though, its losses
may start to matter, as it becomes difficult for Bob to send subnanosecond
pulses still featuring an average of 0.1 photons per pulse at the output of
Alice.
At high repetition frequencies, detectors constitute a third problem. When
implementing a long distance QKD system, it is essential to choose the
wavelength of the photons within the second or third telecom window –
around 1310 and 1550 nm respectively – in order to minimise the
transmission losses and maximise the transfer efficiency. Detecting single
photons at these wavelengths with a reasonable level of background noise is
however difficult. One usually uses Germanium avalanche photodiodes (Ge
APD) biased above breakdown in the so-called Geiger regime. However at
room temperature, these detectors show high dark counts levels. They must
then be cooled to the liquid nitrogen boiling temperature - 77 K - to be used
for QKD. When an avalanche arises in such a diode, a current flows through
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subsequent release of these carriers can trigger avalanches – called
afterpulses - causing false detections, and thus increase the QBER. This
effect becomes particularly significant when the separation between the
pulses is small because of high repetition frequency. To get round this
problem, we turned to InGaAs/InP avalanche photodiodes (Fujitsu
FPP5W1KS). They are operated in gated mode with 2ns activation. This
prevents the current from flowing too long, and limits the population of the
trapping levels. Under similar conditions, these detectors show lower dark
count rates than Ge APD’s. It is thus possible to operate them at higher
temperature, which in turns decreases the lifetime of trapped charges. A
temperature of 173 K offers a trade-off between dark counts and afterpulses.
This temperature is obtained by heating a cryostat immersed in liquid
nitrogen. Operating detectors above the temperature of liquid nitrogen also
offers the advantage of making cooling easier. This temperature does not lie
too far from the lower limit of Peltier cooling, which would be really interesting
in the event of a real world application. Figure 2 shows the performance of
these detectors. The probability of getting a noise count pn ise is plotted
versus hd the detection efficiency. We typically use them with pnoise = 10-5 and
hd = 10%.
Finally, the driving electronics had to be redesigned to allow repetition at 2.5
MHz, as well as train generation and detection. Bob's electronic circuit
contains an oscillator beating at 10 MHz. The various triggering signals are
then generated by counting clock strokes. Fine adjustment between two such
strokes is performed through delay lines with an accuracy of 100 ps. The 260
ps wide optical pulses are generated with a Fujitsu DFB semiconductor laser
at 1310 nm and are separated within a train by 400 ns. Approximately 100 ns
before gating the detectors, the UTP annealed proton exchange LiNbO3
phase modulator is triggered. The applied phase shift is determined by the
value of a random bit generated in real time by a specially developed noise
source (NS). For each detector count, the index of the train and of the pulse,
the outcomes of both detectors and the value of the random phase shift are
stored in a buffer. A PC, where the data are downloaded and processed,
controls the board. As discussed above, the “plug & play” setups do not
require any stabilisation or active adjustment of either the interferometer path
length or the polarisation. However, they do require, as all other systems
using gated photon counters, precise timing of the detectors activation.
Basically, we have to perform a measurement of the total round trip time of
flight of a pulse – approximately 300 ms with the storage line - with a
precision of the order of 100 ps. We have thus implemented a photon
counting optical time domain reflectometer mode within our system. It
measures the time interval between the emission and the detection of a
macroscopic pulse in two stages. To initiate the first stage, the operator is
asked to enter the length of the transmission line with a precision of plus or
minus five kilometres. The system scans this range by steps of 1 ns to find
the reflection of Alice’s mirror, which is orders of magnitude stronger than all
the other parasite reflections in the system. This takes approximately 2
minutes. In the second stage, the system then scans a 2ns wide region
surrounding the detected reflection by steps of 100 ps to fine-tune the timing.
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This takes about one minute. This procedure is carried out automatically by
the computer. Hence the system can be ready to perform QKD in less than
five minutes after the connection of an optical fibre line.
Alice's system is simpler. A PIN photodiode DA with fast amplifier is used to
detect the pulses and generate a timing signal. The signal is delayed to let
the pulse propagate through the storage line before triggering Alice’s
electronic board. This circuit then takes two bits – encoding one of four states
- and passes them to the phase modulator controller. These two bits are
downloaded from a file to make comparison of Alice’s and Bob’s keys
simpler, but they could also be generated by a noise source. A 100ns wide
voltage step is accordingly applied to the Ti indiffused LiNbO3 device. The
pulses cross the modulator twice. The phase is thus modulated on a round
trip. The modulator must feature low polarisation dependent losses, if the
Faraday mirror is to compensate the birefringence of the line. Alice's timing
accuracy is far less stringent than Bob's. She has to be able to apply her
phase shift on one of the two half pulses separated by 200 ns. A precision of
about 50ns is then sufficient. Moreover, her delay does not depend on the
length of the line, but only on the time interval between the detection at DA
and the application of the phase shift. They can then be set once for all in the
laboratory.
Experimental results and comparisons with other systems
This improved setup was tested in the laboratory on a 4.9km optical fibre
spool featuring losses of 4.6 dB, as well as on a 22.8km optical fibre running
under Lake Geneva and connecting the Swiss cities of Geneva and Nyon.
This line features losses of 10.5 dB. The results are presented in Figure 4
and summarised in Table 1. The points show the raw key creation rate Rraw
versus the quantum bit error rate QBER for both transmission fibres. The
solid lines show a linear fit of the experimental data, while the dotted lines
represent the estimate of the useful rate Ruseful after error correction and
privacy amplification for the fitted values of Rraw. It is computed with
equations (6) and (7). These results were obtained with m = 0.1. The
experimental parameter is the gate voltage applied on the detectors, which
controls the detection efficiency ranging from 2.5% to 20%, and the dark
count probability. Key distribution was performed at a raw rate of 1630 and
486 Hz for 4.9 and 23km respectively with QBER of 4 % and 5.4 %. To verify
the quality of the theoretical predictions, we can note that the measured interference
visibility yields a value of 0.14% for QBERopt. On the other hand, QBERdet can
be estimated to be 5.1% for the 23 km link. Afterpulses and Rayleigh
backscattering should not contribute in any noticeable way to the QBER.
These contributions sum up to 5.2%, which is close to the measured QBER
of 5.4%. These results translate to maximum estimated useful rates of 870
Hz and 210 Hz for the laboratory and field measurement respectively. One
notices that the useful rate increases with the QBER. However it would
eventually reach a maximum before decreasing. In both cases, the obtained
raw rates yield useful rates close to the highest point on the curve.
In Table 2, we show some results that confirm the effect of the parameter m.
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We performed key distribution with various setting of Alice’s attenuator
corresponding to average photon numbers of 0.1, 0.2 and 1 on the 23 km
cable and with gate voltage such that hd = 11% and pnoise = 10-5. These
results illustrate well the fact that when m is increased by a factor two, the
QBER is divided and Rraw multiplied accordingly. The same thing happens
with m going from 0.1 to 1. The QBER remains larger than expected though.
This probably comes from the fact that QBERdet only is affected this
parameter. At low error rate, QBERopt starts to be noticeable.
We also justified the use of the storage line, by demonstrating an increase of
the error rate caused by Rayleigh backscattering. We studied the value of the
QBER as a function of the number of pulses per train. The results are shown
in Figure 5. The QBER is constant as long as the length of the trains is
smaller than twice the length of the storage line. When the trains’ length is
increased beyond the storage capacity, the QBER increases. Overfilling by
twenty pulses is sufficient to double the QBER.
The operating temperature of the detectors was also varied. At 193K and
203K, no significant change was observed. At 213K however, performance
clearly deteriorates, through increased QBER. Figure 6 shows the raw key
creation rates versus the QBER for these temperatures. These results are
better than expected. When plugging the values of hd and pnoise obtained by
characterising the detectors in equations (1), (3) and (4), the dark counts
levels appear too high to perform QKD with reasonable error rate above 173
K. The fact that QKD is actually possible indicates that the effective pnoise
must be lower than the value obtained during characterisation. A possible
explanation is that when the detectors generate counts, their noise probability
is reduced. All in all, these results suggest that the possibility to operate
these APD’s for QKD under Peltier cooling is not far.
Finally, it is interesting to compare these results with those obtained by other
groups. We will restrict ourselves to the experiments carried out by the two
groups that have implemented QKD in optical fibres over distances of more
than 20km and with photons at 1310 nm, and published results to date. First
Townsend [8] of BT performed QKD in 1998 over distances ranging from 5
km to 55 km using a standard phase encoding system. For 25 km, he
obtained a raw key creation rate of 500 Hz with a quantum error rate of 2%.
However it is essential to note that he used an average number of photon per
pulse of 0.15, above the commonly used value of 0.1. This prevents us from
directly estimating the useful rate. We must first scale these results to what
could have been expected, if m had been set to 0.1. The scaled raw rate is
360 Hz and the scaled QBER 3 %, yielding a useful rate of 220 Hz.
Second, Hughes et al. [9] of Los Alamos National Laboratory performed in
1997 an experiment over 24 km also with a standard phase encoding system
and obtained a raw rate of 20 Hz and a QBER of 1.6%. In this case too, the
average number of photon per pulse was chosen at 0.4, well above the
commonly used value of 0.1. When scaling these results, one obtains a raw
rate of 6 Hz and a QBER of 6.4 %, yielding a useful rate of 2.2 Hz. Both
these examples illustrate how a high m can boost the performance of a QKD
system at the expense of secrecy.
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As these QKD systems are very similar, the difference between the results
obtained by BT and Los Alamos can be explained by the fact that they used
a repetition frequency of respectively 1 MHz and 10 kHz. There is no reason
to think that Los Alamos could not also increase its repetition frequency to
achieve similar key rates, if their detectors do not yield excessive noise
through afterpulses.
Due to the necessary use of a storage line and the waiting delays it induces,
the “plug & play” setup is intrinsically slower than standard systems at a
given repetition frequency. However this rate reduction can be kept low by
using a suitably long storage line, and is compensated by the truly superior
self-alignment and stability properties.
Conclusion
After the discussion of some guidelines for comparison of different QKD
experiments, we introduce an improved version of the “plug & play” system.
We present then experimental results of key creation over 4.9 km and 23 km
at useful rates of respectively 870 Hz and 210 Hz. Original electronics
allowing easy operation of the system is described. It appears clearly that the
main experimental difficulty remains the photon counting detectors. Their
dark counts constitute the main contribution to QBER and limit thus the
transmission distance. Moreover, simpler cooling – possibly using Peltier
elements – should be considered in the view of an industrial application if
compatible with noise requirements. The reduction of afterpulses by
reduction of the trapping defects density is also important for further increase
of the repetition frequency. However these photon counting APD’s can only
be improved by manufacturers, which unfortunately seem to lack interest.
The performance of the improved “plug & play” system is then measured up
other comparable systems. The useful key creation rate obtained is similar to
the best one to date in similar conditions. We have shown that the problems
caused by the operation of the “plug & play” systems at fast repetition rate
can be overcome to yield high performance, while maintaining unbeatable
adjustment simplicity. In addition, “plug & play” systems may well constitute
the only possibility for QKD over highly unstable optical fibres, such as those
present in aerial cables.
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Tables
Table 1: Experimental performance of the improved “plug & play” quantum
key distribution system tested over an optical fibre spool in the laboratory and
an installed cable.
Environment Distance
[km]
Average number
of photons m
Rraw
[Hz]
Measured
QBER
Estimated
Ruseful [Hz]
Laboratory 4.9 0.1 1630 4 % 870
Installed cable 22.8 0.1 486 5.4 % 210
Table 2: Illustration of the influence of the average number of photons per
pulse m.
Distance [km] Average number
of photons m
Rraw
[Hz]
Measured
QBER
22.8 0.1 129 1.51 %
22.8 0.2 265 0.77 %
22.8 1 1462 0.2%
Table 3: Comparison of experimental realisations of quantum key
distribution.
Group Distance
[km]
m Rraw
[Hz]
Measured
QBER
Scaled
Rraw
[Hz]
Scaled
QBER
Estimated
Ruseful [Hz]
Geneva 22.8 0.1 486 4.5 % NA - 210
BT 25 0.15 500 2 % 360 3 % 220
Los Alamos 24 0.4 20 1.6 % 6.1 6.4 % 2.2
Figure 1 : InGaAs/InP avalanche photodiodes quantum detection efficiency against the time difference 
between the arrival of the photon and the activation of the detector.
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Figure 2 :Schematic diagram of the improved "plug & play" quantum key
distribution system.
Figure 3 : Typical performance of InGaAs/InP avalanche photodiodes in photon counting regime at 173 
K. Noise count probability against quantum detection efficiency.
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Figure 4 : Raw and useful key creation rates against QBER for transmission along 4.9km spool and 
23km installed cable.
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Figure 5 : Quantum bit error rate against length of pulse trains for transmission along 23km installed 
cable.
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Figure 6 : Raw key creation rate against QBER for different detector operating temperatures. 
Transmission along 23km installed cable.
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